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Abstract
In classical tra¢ c ow theory, there are two velocities associated with a given
level of tra¢ c ow. Following Vickrey, economists have termed travel at the
higher speed congested travel and at the lower speed hypercongested travel.
Since the publication of Waltersclassic paper (1961, Econometrica 29, 676-
699), there has been an on-going debate concerning whether a steady-state
hypercongested equilibrium can be stable. For a particular structural model
of downtown tra¢ c ow and parking, this paper demonstrates that a steady-
state hypercongested equilibrium can be stable. Some other sensible models of
tra¢ c congestion conclude that steady-state hypercongested travel cannot be
stable, and that queues develop to ration the demand in steady states. Thus,
we interpret our result to imply that, when steady-state demand is so high
that it cannot be rationed through congested travel, the trip price increase
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necessary to ration the demand may be generated either through the forma-
tion of steady-state queues or through hypercongested travel, and that which
mechanism occurs depends on details of the tra¢ c system.
Keywords: tra¢ c congestion, cruising for parking, on-street parking, hyper-
congestion
JEL Classication: R41, L91
1 Introduction
To non-experts, many academic debates seem arcane. The amount of ink spent on
them seems quite out of proportion to the importance of the issues under debate.
But more often than not, the debates provide a focal point for discussion about
the fundamentals of a eld. In transport economics, there has been only one major
theoretical debate, which has been active for almost fty years. In classical tra¢ c ow
theory (known also as kinematic wave theory or Lighthill-Whitham-Richards (LHR)
tra¢ c ow theory), there are two velocities associated with a given level of ow (for
example, zero ow corresponds to no cars on the road and a complete tra¢ c jam).
Following Vickrey, economists have termed travel at the higher velocity congested
travel and at the lower velocity hypercongested travel. With hypercongested travel, an
increase in ow is associated with an increase in velocity the unjamming of a tra¢ c
jam. Since the seminal article by Walters (1961), the transport economics literature
has debated whether there exist steady-state equilibria with the comparative static
property that, in response to an exogenous change in demand, the change in ow is
positively related to the change in velocity1, and if such equilibria exist whether they
are stable. Put informally, can steady-state tra¢ c behave like a tra¢ c jam? The issue
is fundamental since it concerns the modeling of tra¢ c congestion, which is central
to transport economic theory.
In their recent magisterial textbook, two of the most distinguished transport eco-
nomic theorists, Kenneth Small and Erik Verhoef (2007, ps. 84-86) have proposed
a resolution of the debate, which builds on a series of papers (Verhoef, 1999, 2001,
1Signicant contributions to the earlier debate, listed according to date of publication, are John-
son (1964), Neuberger (1971), Agnew (1977), Dewees (1978), Else (1981,1982), Nash (1982), and
McDonald and dOuville (1988)
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and 2003; and Small and Chu, 2003) written over several years, during the course of
which the authorsthinking on the subject evolved. Their proposed resolution, which
we shall explain in greater detail in the next section, is that the backward-bending
portion of the steady-state user cost curve should be replaced by a vertical section,
corresponding to a verticalqueue. Consider a road system in which steady-state
demand is so high that it cannot be rationed through congested travel. They argue
that trip price increases to ration the demand through the formation of steady-state
queues rather than through hypercongested travel.2
In this paper, we examine the stability of steady-state equilibria in a structural model
of downtown parking and tra¢ c congestion (Arnott and Inci, 2006) through a detailed
analysis of the models non-stationary dynamics. We show that, in the context of this
model and with the type of stability we consider, there do exist stable, hypercongested,
steady-state equilibria. Since our model is not general, we interpret our result to im-
ply that, when steady-state demand is so high that it cannot be rationed through
congested travel, the trip price increase necessary to ration the demand may be gen-
erated either through the formation of steady-state queues or through hypercongested
travel, and that which mechanism occurs depends on details of the tra¢ c system.
Section 2 provides a technical statement of the debate over the existence of a stable,
hypercongested, steady-state tra¢ c equilibrium, and reviews the relevant literature.
Section 3 describes the model. Section 4 derives the models steady-state equilibria
and identies which are hypercongested. Section 5 investigates the stability of the
equilibria. Section 6 discusses the results.
2 Do There Exist Stable, Hypercongested, Steady-
State Tra¢ c Equilibria? A Review of the De-
bate
Imagine a homogeneous road between two locations with a constant ow of cars along
it. Denote ow with f . Assume that tra¢ c congestion is described by a technological
2They develop their argument for a straight highway but we at least interpret them as implying
that their proposed resolution applies to tra¢ c systems generally.
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relationship between velocity, v, and density, V , with velocity being inversely related
to density. For the sake of concreteness, assume Greenshields Relation (1935), which
species that there is a negative linear relationship between velocity and density:
v = vf (1  V
Vj
) or V = Vj(1  v
vf
) ; (i)
where vf is free-ow velocity and Vj is jam density. The Fundamental Identity of
Tra¢ c Flow is that ow equals velocity times density:
f = V  v : (ii)
Combining (i) and (ii) gives ow as a function of velocity:
f =
Vj(vf   v)v
vf
; (iii)
which is an inverted and translated parabola and is displayed in Figure 1.
Maximum ow is referred to as capacity (ow). There are two velocities associated
with each level of ow below capacity ow. Following Vickrey, economists refer to
travel at the higher velocity as congested tra¢ c ow and travel at the lower velocity
as hypercongested ow. Congested tra¢ c ow is informally interpreted as smooth-
owing tra¢ c and hypercongested tra¢ c ow as a tra¢ c jam situation.
Figure 1: Flow as a function of velocity
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Assume to simplify that the money costs of travel are zero and that the value of travel
time is independent of tra¢ c conditions and is the same for all cars. Then the cost of
a trip, c, is simply the value of travel time, , times travel time, t, which is the inverse
of speed, times the length of the street, which we normalize to one, without loss of
generality: c = t = =v or v = =c. Substituting this into (iii) gives the relationship
between trip cost and ow:
f =
Vj(vfc  )
vfc2
: (iv)
Figure 2 plots trip cost on the y-axis against ow on the x-axis. The upward-sloping
portion of the curve corresponds to congested travel; the downward-sloping portion
corresponds to hypercongested travel. In the literature, this curve is referred to as
the user cost curve or the supply curve of travel. The trip demand curve relates the
(ow) demand for travel to trip price. Assume that no toll is applied, so that trip
price equals user cost, and trip demand can be expressed as a function of user cost.
Now draw in a linear trip demand curve that intersects the user cost curve three
times, once on the upward-sloping portion of the user cost curve and twice on the
backward-bending portion of the user cost curve. The rst intersection point is a
congested equilibrium, the latter two are hypercongested equilibria. Label the three
equilibria e1, e2, and e3.
The issue that has been much debated concerns the stability of the latter two equilib-
ria. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that an equilibrium is dened to be stable if,
when an extra car is added to the entry tra¢ c ow, the tra¢ c ow eventually returns
to that equilibriums level. Even if the tra¢ c inow rate, apart from the added car,
is held constant, solving for the transient dynamics of tra¢ c ow is very di¢ cult.
But perhaps one should also take into account that the added car will a¤ect tra¢ c
ow, hence user cost, and hence the tra¢ c inow rate in the future, which makes the
analysis even more di¢ cult. To circumvent this complexity, Else (1981) and Nash
(1982), viewing equilibrium as the intersection of demand and supply curves, apply
conventional economic adjustment dynamics without reference to the physics of traf-
c ow. Assuming that the addition of a car results in a disequilibrium increase in
trip price and that disequilibrium adjustment occurs via price, Else argues that e3 is
locally stable. Assuming instead that the addition of a car results in a disequilibrium
increase in ow and that disequilibrium adjustment occurs via quantity, Nash argues
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Figure 2: Stability of equilibria
that e3 is locally unstable.3
There is now broad agreement that this stability issue cannot be resolved without
dealing explicitly with the dynamics of tra¢ c ow. Unfortunately, providing a com-
plete solution even for tra¢ c ow on a uniform point-input, point-output road with
an exogenous inow function is formidably di¢ cult.4 The literature has responded in
four qualitatively di¤erent ways to the intractability of obtaining complete solutions
to this class of problems:
1. Derive qualitative solution properties, while fully respecting the physics of tra¢ c
3Both papers consider only the case where the demand curve is atter than the backward-bending
portion of the user cost curve, and therefore do not investigate the properties of e2. Applying Elses
analysis to e2 would lead to the conclusion that it is unstable, applying Nashs that it is stable.
Applying either analysis to e1 would lead to the conclusion that it is stable.
4One inserts an equation relating velocity to density such as (i) into the equation of continuity
(the continuous version of the conservation of mass), which yields a non-linear, rst-order, partial
di¤erential equation. Applying the appropriate boundary conditions, one can in principle solve for
density as a function of time and location along the road. Unfortunately, the partial di¤erential
equation does not have a closed-form solution for any sensible equation relating velocity and density.
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ow.5 This approach is the ideal but is mathematically demanding.
2. Employ an assumption that simplies the congestion technology, while continuing
to treat location and time as continuous. One example is the zero propagation
assumption that a cars travel time on the road depends only on either the entry
rate to the road at the time the car enters the road (Henderson, 1981) or the exit
rate from the road at the time the car exits the road (Chu, 1995). Another example
is the innite propagationassumption that the speed of all cars on the road at a
point in time depends on either the entry rate to the road or the exit rate from it
(Agnew, 1977). Neither of these assumptions is consistent with classical ow theory.
The question then arises as to whether the qualitative results of a model employing
such assumptions are spurious.
3. Replace the partial di¤erential equation with a discrete approximation discretiz-
ing time and location and then solve the resulting di¤erence equation numerically.
One such discrete approximation is Daganzos cell transmission model (Daganzo,
1992). Again, there is the concern that such approximations may give rise to spuri-
ous solution properties.
4. Adopt an even simpler tra¢ c geometry in which the road system is isotropic, so
that the entry and exit rates, as well as travel velocity, density, and ow, are the
same everywhere on the network. This eliminates the spatial dimension of congestion
so that the partial di¤erential equation reduces to an ordinary di¤erential equation.
The second model of Small and Chu (2003) adopts this simplication, as do we in
this paper. Unlike the previous two approaches, this approach does not entail any
dubious approximation, but one may reasonably question the generality of results
derived from models of an isotropic network.
Whatever approach is adopted, the issues arise as to the appropriate denition of
equilibrium and the appropriate concept of stability to apply. This paper considers
only steady-state equilibrium, in which the inow rate and tra¢ c ow remain constant
5Lindsey (1980) considered an innite road of uniform width subject to classical ow congestion,
with no cars entering or leaving the road. He proved that, if there is hypercongestion at no point
along the road at some initial time, there will be hypercongestion at no point along the road in the
future. Verhoef (1999) considered a nite road of uniform width with a single entry point and a
single exit point. He argued (Prop. 2b) that if there is hypercongestion at no point along the road at
some initial time, and if the constant inow rate is less than capacity, there will be hypercongestion
at no point along the road in the future. Verhoef (2001) developed the argument further using a
simplied variant of car-following theory in which drivers control their speeds directly.
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over time.6 The most familiar concept of stability is local stability. Start in a steady-
state equilibrium. Perturb it (which implies an innitesimal change) is some specied
way. If the system always returns to that steady-state equilibrium, it is said to be
locally stable with respect to that type of perturbation. In their textbook discussion of
the stability of steady-state tra¢ c equilibrium, Small and Verhoef employ a somewhat
di¤erent concept of stability dynamic stability. They dene a stationary-state tra¢ c
equilibrium to be dynamically stable if it can arise as the end state following some
transitional phase initiated by a change in the inow rate.
The stage is now set to present Small and Verhoefs textbook (2007, ps. 84-86)
discussion of the stability of steady-state equilibria on a uniform road. They argue
as follows:
One di¢ culty with [the] conventional stability analysis [of steady-
state tra¢ c equilibria] is that the perturbations considered involve si-
multaneous change in the ow rates into and along the road, which is
physically impossible. It therefore seems more appropriate to consider
perturbations of the inow rate, treating ow levels along the road as en-
dogenous. Doing so introduces the concept of dynamic stability: can a
given stationary state arise as the end state following some transitional
phase initiated by a change in the inow rate?
Verhoef (2001) examines dynamic stability using the car-following model
[...], allowing for vertical queuing before the entrance when inows can-
not be physically accommodated on the road. He nds that the entire
6Small and Chu (2003), Verhoef (2003), and Small and Verhoef (2006) consider two di¤erent
types of equilibria. One type is the steady-state equilibrium, which was the focus of the earlier
literature and will be the focus of this paper. Small and Verhoef reasonably question the relevance
of these equilibria since practically tra¢ c demand is not stationary over the day; rather, there are
well-dened morning and evening rush hours. They examine an alternative concept of equilibrium
that was originally proposed by Vickrey (1969) in the context of the bottleneck model (in which
congestion takes the form of a vertical queue behind a bottleneck of xed ow capacity). The
idea is that over the rush hour individuals choose between traveling at an inconvenient time when
tra¢ c is less congested or at a convenient time when tra¢ c is more congested. The full trip price
then includes both inconvenience and travel time costs. With identical individuals, the equilibrium
condition is that no individual can reduce her full trip price by altering her travel time. Verhoef
(2003) refers to the corresponding equilibria as dynamic, while Small and Chu (2003) refers to it as
an endogenous scheduling equilibrium. Employing this equilibrium concept, both papers argue that
hypercongestion can occur in equilibrium over a portion of the rush hour, but not over the rush hour
as a whole since equilibrium trip cost increases with the number of travelers.
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hypercongested branch of the [user cost] curve is dynamically unstable.
[...] [What arises instead is a dynamically stable steady state involving] a
maximum ow on the road, a constant-length queue before its entrance,
[...] and rates of queue-entries and queue-exits both equal to the capacity
of the road. It does not involve hypercongestion on the road itself; rather,
hypercongestion exists only within the entrance queue when it is modeled
horizontally, as in Verhoef (2003). [...] Note that the ow rate and speed
inside the queue are irrelevant to total trip time, making the economic
properties of the model independent of the shape of the hypercongested
portion of the speed-ow curve, even though tra¢ c in the queue travels
at a hypercongested speed.
Essentially they argue that, when steady-state demand for the road is so high that
its use cannot be rationed through congested travel, equilibrium exists, is unique and
dynamically stable, and entails a steady-state queue at the entry point whose length
adjusts to clear the market, with the road operating at capacity. In line with this
argument, they replace the backward-bending portion of the user cost curve with a
vertical segment at capacity ow.
In their papers, Small and Verhoef consider a variety of di¤erent models, includ-
ing a couple in which the road is non-uniform. The properties of these models are
broadly consistent with their textbook discussion. While Small and Verhoef do dis-
cuss contrary views and are not dogmatic, the impression left from their textbook
discussion, complemented by their papers, is that, whatever the nature of the road
system, the backward-bending portion of the steady-state user cost curve should al-
ways be replaced by a vertical segment at capacity ow, and that stable, steady-state
hypercongested equilibria never exist. We suspect that their views are more nuanced
than their textbook discussion suggests, but nonetheless that they would still argue
that in normal circumstances their proposed resolution of the debate applies.
In this paper, we shall undertake an exhaustive stability analysis of a simple model in
which stable, steady-state hypercongested equilibria do exist (by exhaustive stability
analysis, we mean one that provides a complete characterization of the models tran-
sient dynamics with steady-state demand from all initial conditions). The model is
of an isotropic road network. Its essential feature is that cruising for parking occurs
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in equilibrium, with cars cruising for parking behaving like a (random access) queue
that interferes with tra¢ c ow. While a particular model does not prove that Small
and Verhoefs resolution is less general than they appear to believe, in the concluding
discussion we argue that the reduction in throughput caused by cruising for parking
is representative of a wide range of phenomena in heavily-congested tra¢ c systems
and of congestible systems in general.
3 Model Description
The model is aimed at describing downtown tra¢ c and its interaction with on-street
parking. A detailed description of a slightly di¤erent version of the model, which
focuses only on the steady states under saturated parking conditions, can be found in
Arnott and Inci (2006). This paper treats the nonstationary dynamics of the model
with a special focus on stability and allows for transitions between saturated and
unsaturated parking conditions.
The downtown area has an isotropic (spatially homogeneous) network of streets. For
concreteness, one can imagine a Manhattan network of one-way streets. We assume
that all travel is by car and that there are only on-street parking spaces.7 Each driver
enters the downtown area, drives to his destination, parks there immediately if a
vacant parking space is available and otherwise circles the block until a parking space
becomes available, visits his destination for an exogenous length of time, and then
exits the downtown area. Drivers di¤er in driving distance and visit length. Driving
distance is Poisson distributed in the population with mean m, and visit length is
Poisson distributed with mean l.
Downtown parking spaces are continuously provided over the space. Drivers are risk
neutral expected utility maximizers. There may be three kinds of cars on streets: cars
in transit, cars cruising for parking, and cars parked. Apart from the architecture of
the street (i.e.; a curbside allocated to parking and the width of the streets), the
travel speed depends on the density of these two types of cars on the streets. We
assume that cars cruising for parking slow down tra¢ c more than cars in transit and
7Arnott (2006) focuses on o¤-street parking in a downtown area and Arnott and Rowse (forth-
coming) extends the current model to allow for both on- and o¤-street parking.
10
thus contribute more to congestion.
Let T be the pool of cars in transit per unit area, C be the pool of cars cruising
for parking per unit area, and P be the pool of on-street parking spaces per unit
area (which is held constant throughout the paper). The tra¢ c technology is dened
by an in-transit travel time function t(T;C; P ) where t is per unit distance.8 Let
Pmax be the maximum possible number of on-street parking spaces per unit area.
We assume that the technology satises tT > 0; tC > 0; tP > 0 , t(0; 0; P ) > 0,
limP!Pmax t(T;C; P ) =1, and t is convex in T , C, and P .
Denoting the rate of entry into the network per unit area-time by D and the exit rate
from the pool of cars in transit by E, we can write the rate of change in the pool of
cars in transit as follows:
_T (u) = D(u)  E(u) ; (1)
where u is the time. This trivially describes the evolution of the pool of cars in-
transit at every instant. Describing the evolution of downtown parking is less trivial.
If the amount of curbside parking constrains the ow of cars the tra¢ c system can
accommodate, there are two régimes of downtown parking and the system may switch
from one to the other.
In the rst régime, the downtown parking is saturated, meaning that a vacant parking
space is immediately taken by a car cruising for parking. In this régime, all parking
spaces are lled at any given time but the pool of cars cruising for parking evolves
over time. Therefore, when parking is saturated, the rate of change in the pool of
cars cruising for parking is simply the di¤erence between the entry rate into the pool
of cars cruising for parking and the exit rate from it, or simply
_C(u) = E(u)  Z(u) ; (2)
where E now denotes the entry rate into the pool of cars cruising for parking from
the pool of cars in transit, which equals the exit rate from the in-transit pool, and
Z the exit rate from the pool of cars cruising for parking. In this régime, the pool
of occupied parking spaces, S, remains xed (so that _S = 0), but the pool of cars
8Note that we assume that P enters the in-transit travel time function even when parking is
unsaturated. The rationale is that even one car parked curbside on a city block precludes the use of
that lane for tra¢ c ow over the entire block.
11
cruising for parking evolves.
In the second régime, parking is unsaturated, meaning that there are empty parking
spaces so that cars in transit can nd a parking space upon arrival at their destina-
tions.9 In this régime, the stock of cars cruising for parking is zero (so that trivially
_C is zero too) but the pool of occupied parking spaces evolves. The evolution of S is
given by
_S(u) = E(u) X(u) ; (3)
where E is now the entry rate into the pool of occupied parking spaces from the pool
of cars in transit, which equals the exit rate from the in-transit pool, and X the exit
rate from the pool of occupied parking spaces.
To be able to write the equations of motion more specically, we shall now turn to
characterizing D, E, Z and X in detail. The demand function, D, is a function of
the perceived mean full trip price, F ,
D = D(F ); D(0) =1; D(1) = 0; D0 < 0 : (4)
The mean full trip price at time u depends on the in-transit travel time cost, the
(mean) cruising-for-parking time cost, and the cost of on-street parking, at this point
in time. Denoting the value of time with  and the on-street parking fee with , the
mean full trip price can be written as follows10:
F = (mt(T (u); C(u); P ) +
C(u)l
P
) + l : (5)
The exit rate from the in-transit pool equals the stock of cars in the in-transit pool
multiplied by the probability that a car will exit the in-transit pool per unit time11:
E(u) =
T (u)
mt(T (u); C(u); P )
: (6)
9Arnott and Rowse (1999) provides a more sophisticated treatment of unsaturated parking in
which cruising for parking occurs. In contrast to the model of this paper, their city is located on an
annulus. On the basis of the parking occupancy rate, a driver decides how far from his destination
to start cruising for parking, takes the rst available vacant space, and walks from there to his
destination. Adapting this more sophisticated treatment of unsaturated parking here should not
substantially alter our results.
10One could dene the full price of a trip to include the time cost of a visit, as is done in Arnott
and Inci (2006).  would then be dened as the time and money cost of a visit per unit time.
11Appendix A.2 derives this equilibrium condition.
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Due to the assumption that visit durations are generated by a Poisson process, the
probability that an occupied parking space is vacated per unit time is 1=l. Thus,
when parking is saturated, the exit rate from the cruising-for-parking pool equals
that probability multiplied by the number of parking spaces, P :
Z(u) =
P
l
: (7)
When parking is unsaturated, the exit rate from the pool of occupied parking spaces
is dened similarly. X is the probability that a particular parking space is vacated,
1=l, times the number of occupied parking spaces at that particular time, S(u):
X(u) =
S(u)
l
: (8)
After substituting out the variables E, Z, and X, downtown tra¢ c is characterized
by the following autonomous di¤erential equation system with two régimes.
Régime 1 :
8>><>>:
_T (u) = D((mt(T (u); C(u); P ) + C(u)l
P
) + l)  T (u)
mt(T (u);C(u);P )
_C(u) = T (u)
mt(T (u);C(u);P )
  P
l
_S(u) = 0
(9)
Régime 2 :
8>><>>:
_T (u) = D((mt(T (u); 0; P ) + l)  T (u)
mt(T (u);0;P )
_C(u) = 0
_S(u) = T (u)
mt(T (u);0;P )
  S(u)
l
:
(10)
In Section 4, we shall focus on these two régimes in turn. That the two di¤erential
equation systems are autonomous allows us to employ a phase plane analysis to
investigate the stability of the tra¢ c system, converting what would otherwise be
an essentially intractable problem into one that is straightforward to analyze. To
achieve autonomy, we made three essential simplifying assumptions: i) trip length
is Poisson distributed; ii) visit duration is Poisson distributed; and iii) travel demand
at time u is a function only of the state variables, C and T , at time u. The former
Poisson assumption makes the exit rate from the pool of cars at time u dependent on
only the stock of cars in transit and cruising for parking at time u. The latter Poisson
assumption makes the exit rate from the pool of parked cars at time u dependent only
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on the stock of cars parked at time u. The three assumptions together imply that the
dynamics of the tra¢ c system depend only on the systems state variables, T , C, and
S, and not separately on time. Put alternatively, the history of the tra¢ c system is
fully captured by the values of the state variables.
None of these assumptions is realistic. The assumption on demand is particularly
objectionable because it is hard to justify on the basis of microfoundations. Our
justication for making these assumptions is that together they permit a complete
stability analysis that fully respects the physics of tra¢ c ow, which no previous pa-
pers have been able to perform. Thus, our paper provides a rigorous stability analysis
of a highly particular model. While we cannot claim that the results of our analy-
sis are general, we believe that the underlying reasons that the stability properties
of the model di¤er from those of Small and Verhoef are general. In particular, we
believe that our model is representative of tra¢ c systems in which the dissipative
activity required to clear the travel market when demand is high undermines system
performance.
4 Analysis of Steady-state Equilibrium
In this section, we characterize the steady-state equilibria of the model and display
them graphically. In any steady-state equilibrium, the entry rate into each pool equals
the corresponding exit rate from it, so that the size of each pool is time invariant.
We have the following denitions:
Denition 1 (Saturated equilibrium) A saturated steady-state equilibrium is a
triple fT;C; Sg such that _T (u) = 0, _C(u) = 0, _S(u) = 0, and S = P .
Denition 2 (Unsaturated equilibrium) An unsaturated steady-state equilibrium
is a triple fT;C; Sg such that _T (u) = 0, _C(u) = 0, _S(u) = 0, and C = 0.
4.1 Régime 1: Saturated steady-state equilibria
We shall start with the saturated steady-state equilibrium associated with régime 1
shown in (9). There are cars cruising for parking in any tra¢ c equilibrium in which
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parking is saturated. The parking spots are completely full at any given time and
once a spot is vacated it is immediately lled by a car that is currently cruising for
parking. We make two additional assumptions regarding the tra¢ c technology and
the street architecture. First, we assume that cars cruising for parking contribute to
congestion more than cars in transit.
Assumption 1 tC > tT .
We distinguish between ow and throughput. We dene ow to be the number of
cars passing a point on a street per unit time. Flow therefore includes both cars
in transit and cars cruising for parking. By multiplying the ow, so dened, by
the number of streets per unit area, we could dene ow per unit area. We dene
throughput to be the entry rate of cars into a unit area, which in steady state equals
the exit rate of cars per unit area. Since cars cruising for parking circle around the
block rather than enter or exit the downtown area, throughput includes only cars
in transit. Thus cars cruising for parking do not contribute to throughput but only
to the tra¢ c ow. Throughput capacity, the maximum throughput consistent with
the congestion technology, which occurs when there are no cars cruising for parking,
equals maxTfT  (mt(T; 0; P )g. The second assumption is that this exceeds the exit
rate from saturated parking, P=l, since otherwise parking would never be saturated
in a steady-state equilibrium.
Assumption 2 max
T
T
mt(T;0;P )
> P
l
.
These two assumptions along with the assumption of convexity of t in T and C imply
that T=(mt(T; 0; P )) = P=l has two roots. For the existence of a saturated tra¢ c
equilibrium, the entry rate in the absence of cruising for parking must lie between
these two roots. Arnott and Inci (2006) proved that there is a unique saturated
steady-state equilibrium when that holds. Apart from the fact that the pool of
occupied parking spaces is time invariant with _S(u) = 0, the unique equilibrium
is characterized by two equations. First, we know that, in any saturated steady-state
equilibrium, the entry rate into the in-transit pool equals the exit rate from that pool,
D =
T
mt
: (11)
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Second, with saturated parking, the entry rate into the cruising-for-parking pool
equals the exit rate from it,
T
mt
=
P
l
: (12)
Eqs. (11) and (12) represent _T (u) = 0 and _C(u) = 0, respectively.12 Figure 3 draws
these equations in the T  C space with plausible functional specications taken from
Arnott and Inci (2006) that we specify below.13
Figure 3: Saturated, steady-state equilibrium in T C space
Suppose that travel time t is weakly separable between (T;C) and P ; refer to the sub-
function V (T;C) as the e¤ective density function, and !(P ) as the e¤ective capacity
function. As usual, suppose also that t depends on the ratio of e¤ective density and
capacity, so that t = t(V (T;C)=!(P )). We measure e¤ective density in terms of
12A quick way to see the uniqueness of the equilibrium in T   C space is to make use of the
steady-state relationship, mt = T l=P , which yields D = P=l. Then the two equations governing
the stationary equilibrium are D = P=l and T=(mt) = P=l, which intersect once, if they intersect.
13Figure 3 draws bE1d as the _T = 0 locus. Technically, there is another portion of the _T = 0
locus, the jam density line. Since tra¢ c is jammed, the trip price is innite so that the demand
inow is zero, and the trip time is innite so that T=mt is also zero. Since this portion of the locus
is irrelevant in the stability analysis, we shall refer to bE1d as the _T = 0 locus in this space.
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in-transit car equivalents, and assume it to take the following form:
V (T;C) = T + C;  > 1 ; (13)
so that a car cruising for parking contributes  times as much to congestion as a car
in transit. Finally, we assume that Greenshields Relation (1935) holds, so that the
speed of cars is a decreasing linear function of e¤ective density. We therefore have
t =
t0
1  V (T;C)
Vj
; (14)
where t0 is free-ow travel time and Vj is jam density. We shall also assume that
demand is iso-elastic so that
D(F ) = D0F
a ; (15)
where D0 > 0 is a measure of the market size and a < 0 the constant elasticity
of demand. Given these assumptions, as shown in Figure 3, the implicit function
C(T ) dened by _C(u) = 0 is a concave function having two roots at C = 0, both
of which are greater than zero and less than Vj. The _T = 0 locus has two parts.
The rst intersects C = 0 potentially multiple times between zero and less than Vj,
The second, which is not immediately obvious, is the jam density line, since at jam
density, the LHS of (11) is zero since the trip price is innite and the RHS is zero
since trip time is innite. As mentioned above, if the _C(u) = 0 and _T (u) = 0 loci
intersect they do so once, establishing the unique saturated equilibrium, E1, shown in
Figure 3. In section 4.3, we shall dene congestion and hypercongestion. According
to the denitions there, whether E1 is congested or hypercongested depends on where
the _C = 0 and _T = 0 loci intersect. The "qualitative" curvature of the gures in
this paper can be obtained with the following parametric specications: m = 2 miles,
l = 2 hours,  = $20 per hour, t0 = 0:05 hours per mile, P = 3712 parking spaces
per square mile, Vj = 1778:17 per square mile,  = $1 per hour, D0 = 3190:04, and
a =  0:2.
For future reference, note that the _C = 0 locus cuts the T axis at points a and c,
and that with the assumed functional forms, the _T (u) = 0 locus cuts the T axis
twice, at points b and d. One other important thing to mention is that there can be
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no equilibrium above the jam density line AB (T + C = Vj).14 Hence, the relevant
subspace for the analysis of saturated equilibria is inside the triangle ANB (where
N is the point where C = 0, T = 015). We shall see that under Assumption 2, which
states that the maximum throughput is limited by the parking constraint, there are
two unsaturated equilibrium, in addition to the saturated equilibrium, one of which
corresponds to gridlock. If Assumption 2 did not hold, the parking constraint would
never bind, and there would be three unsaturated equilibria.
4.2 Régime 2: Unsaturated steady-state equilibria
Unsaturated equilibria correspond to régime 2 whose equation system is given in
(10). The stock of cars cruising for parking is zero so that a driver nds a parking
space immediately upon reaching his destination. The stock of occupied parking
space adjusts until the system reaches a steady state. Apart from C(u) = 0 (and
_C(u) = 0), two equations characterize an unsaturated steady-state equilibrium. The
rst is again that the entry rate into the in-transit pool equal the exit rate from it:
D =
T
mt
: (16)
The second is that the entry rate into the pool of occupied parking spaces equal the
exit rate from it.
T
mt
=
S
l
: (17)
Figure 4 draws these equations in T   S space with the functional specications
indicated above. Eq. (16) is the same as (11) with C = 0. Thus, in T   S space one
part of the _T = 0 locus is vertical at the T coordinates corresponding to the points
b and d, the other part is vertical at jam density. Eq. (17) has an inverted U-shape,
passes through the origin and (Vj; 0), and intersects S = P at the points a and c,
where the _C = 0 locus intersects C = 0. Thus, each of the vertical lines associated
with _T = 0 intersects _S = 0 exactly once, leading to three potential unsaturated
equilibria, E2, E3, and E4.
14Given (13), the jam density curve is linear as shown in Figure 3, but not generally otherwise.
15Later we work in (T;C; S) space, for which the origin is (0; 0; 0). We do not refer to the point
N as the origin since its coordinates in this space are (0; 0; P ).
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Figure 4: Unsaturated, steady-state equilibrium in T S space
Above S = P , parking becomes saturated so that (17) ceases to apply. This is
indicated in the diagram by the dashes along _S = 0 for S > P . Thus, the parking
capacity constraint rules out E4 as an equilibrium.16 For future reference, the relevant
subspace for our analysis in the T   S plane is the rectangle ONBVj.
Figure 5 displays the models equilibria in a diagram similar to Figure 2, but modied
by replacing ow with throughput and adding the parking capacity constraint (which
by Assumption 2 is less than capacity throughput). The equilibrium E3 is not shown
since it corresponds to the intersection point of the demand function and the user
cost function at zero throughput and innite trip price. The gure also shows clearly
why the parking capacity constraint rules out E4 as an equilibrium.
In the next subsection we shall investigate whether tra¢ c ow corresponding to each
of these equilibria is congested or hypercongested, and in the next section the stability
16Under Assumption 2, the parking constraint binds. If it did not bind, parking would never be
saturated, there would be no saturated equilibria and three unsaturated equilibria, E2, E3, and E4.
Appendix A.3 briey discusses the case in which there is no parking capacity constraint.
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Note: There is another equilibrium, E3, in which ow is zero and trip price is innite.
Figure 5: Unsaturated, steady-state equilibrium in ow-trip price space
properties of the three equilibria.
4.3 Identifying hypercongestion
Recall that we have made a distinction between the (physical) density of tra¢ c mea-
sured in cars per unit area, and the e¤ective density of tra¢ c measured in in-transit
car-equivalents per unit area, which takes into account that a car cruising for parking
generates more congestion than a car in transit. The fundamental identity of tra¢ c
ow holds if ow and density are both dened in terms of physical cars. It also holds
if ow and density are dened in terms of car equivalents. We have however chosen
to work with e¤ective density, since that is what tra¢ c congestion is a function of,
but to use the term ow to refer to the physical ow of cars, since that is what a
bystander would observe. Thus, we must proceed with care.
We have assumed that tra¢ c congestion is described by Greenshields Relation,
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adapted to take into account cars cruising for parking. In particular, we have as-
sumed that
v = vf (1  V
Vj
) or V = Vj(1  v
vf
) ; (18)
where v is velocity, vf free ow velocity, V is e¤ective density, and Vj is e¤ective jam
density. We dene congestion and hypercongestion in the following way:
Denition 3 (Congestion, hypercongestion) Congestion occurs when tra¢ c ve-
locity is greater than that associated with capacity throughput, hypercongestion when
tra¢ c velocity is less than that associated with capacity throughput.
Since capacity throughput is the maximum possible throughput, which occurs when
there are no cars cruising for parking, its calculation does not require distinguishing
between e¤ective and physical cars. Capacity throughput equals capacity ow:
f c = max
v
vV (v) = max
v
v

Vj(1  v
vf
)

=
Vjvf
4
: (19)
The velocity associated with capacity throughout put is vf=2. Since there is a one-
to-one correspondence between velocity and e¤ective density, we may equivalently
dene tra¢ c to be hypercongested if e¤ective density is greater than that associated
without capacity throughput. Thus, we have that travel is hypercongested if
V (T;C) >
Vj
2
; (20)
and congested when the inequality is reversed. For the particular e¤ective density
function we have assumed in (13), we obtain that travel is hypercongested if
T + C >
Vj
2
; (21)
and is congested otherwise. We refer to the equation T + C = Vj=2 as the boundary
locus, since it separates the region of congested travel from the region of hypercon-
gested travel. Figure 6 plots the boundary locus, as well as the _T = 0 and _C = 0
loci in T   C space. The boundary locus has a slope of  1=. Travel below the
locus is congested, and above the locus is hypercongested. We dene equilibria to be
congested or hypercongestion accordingly. In particular:
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Denition 4 (Congested equilibrium, hypercongested equilibrium) An equi-
librium is congested when congestion according to Denition 3 occurs, and hypercon-
gested otherwise.
As drawn, the equilibrium E1 is hypercongested.
Note: The gure is drawn choosing parameters such that the saturated equilibrium is
hypercongested. With a di¤erent choice of parameters the saturated equilibrium
can instead be congested.
Figure 6: Identifying hypercongested travel in T C space
5 Stability Analysis
This section carries out the stability analysis by combining the two régimes. We start
our analysis by stating our notions of hypercongestion and (dynamic) stability.
Denition 5 (Stability) (i) A steady-state equilibrium is said to be locally stable17
if it can be reached from all initial tra¢ c conditions in its neighborhood; (ii) a steady-
state equilibrium is said to be saddle-path stable if it can be reached only from
initial tra¢ c conditions on one of its arms; (iii) A steady-state equilibrium is said to
17This is sometimes called asymptotically stable.
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be dynamically stable if it can be reached from at least one initial tra¢ c condition
other than itself.18
For a complete stability analysis, we need to take into account not only transition
between the two régimes but also the possibility that tra¢ c might get stuck at jam
density. Régime 1 (the saturated régime) is shown in Figure 3 in T   C space, and
régime 2 (the unsaturated régime) in Figure 4 in T   S space. The two régimes
may be analyzed simultaneously in the three-dimensional gure in T   C   S space
displayed in Figure 7. We shall explain how to read this gure before analyzing the
stability of the equilibria.
Figure 7: Saturated and unsaturated steady-state equilibrium in T C S space
The vertical T  C plane reproduces Figure 3 with some added detail. The horizontal
T S plane reproduces Figure 4 with some added detail. The fold where the two planes
18Dynamic stability is therefore weaker than the other two.
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join is along C = 0 and S = P , with N representing the point (T;C; S) = (0; 0; P )
and B the point (Vj; 0; P ).
Consider the T   C plane. The line AB corresponds to jam density. Since densities
above jam density are infeasible, the feasible region of the plane is the triangle NAB.
The _T = 0 and the _C = 0 loci divide the plane into four areas, labeled x1, x2, x3,
and x4. In each of these regions, the direction of motion of C and T shown by the
arrows is the same; for example, in region x1, C is decreasing and T is increasing.
The pointM is the point on the jam density locus whose trajectory leads to the point
d.
Now consider the T   S plane. The line BVj corresponds to jam density. Since
densities above jam density are infeasible, the feasible region of the plane is the
rectangle ONBVj. The _S = 0 locus and the three parts of the _T = 0 locus divide the
plane into six areas, z1, z2, z3, z4, z5, and z6. In each of these regions, the direction
of motion is the same; for example in region z1, T is increasing and S is decreasing.
In summary, xi and zj (where i 2 f1; :::; 4g and j 2 f1; :::; 6g) denote areas, and the
corresponding vector elds for each area are shown in each of them; the point 0 is the
origin of the 3D gure; the points a, b, c, and d are as dened before; the dotted lines
indicate jam density situations; E1 is the saturated equilibrium; E2 is an unsaturated
equilibrium; E3 is another unsaturated equilibrium in which there is a gridlock; as
drawn, all of these equilibria are hypercongested.19
We shall now state the only proposition of the paper, from which we deduce our main
ndings.
Proposition 1 Any starting point on the locus MdE2g moves to E2. Any starting
point to the left of the locus moves to E1, and any starting point to the right of the
locus moves to E3.
Proof. We shall prove this proposition in three steps.
1. Areas in the triangle ANB :
19One might argue the possibility of a limit cycle. However, it is ruled out by Bendixsons
Nonexistence Criterion for the equations of motion of régime 1. Vector elds show that it cannot
happen for the equations of motion of régime 2, either. We conjecture that there cannot be a limit
cycle circling between the régimes. Figure 9 in Appendix A.1 shows couple of trajectories.
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 Area x1 (excluding the adjustment path Md) : The vector elds in
this area point south-east. Any initial condition in x1 will either hit E1 or
E3.
For su¢ ciently high values of C, the trajectories will reach the equilib-
rium E1. They will approach the _C = 0 locus before reaching E1 since
the vector elds right below the locus (in area x2) point north-east.
The trajectories for low values of T and C will hit the line segment Na.
Once they hit Na, C cannot further decrease since it cannot go below
zero. Thus, parking becomes unsaturated and the vector elds in area
z1 will apply. The trajectory will pass through a0 and enter the area
z2. The vector elds in this area will then carry the trajectories toward
the line segment ab either via area z2 or via the _T = 0 locus in the
T S plane. On the line segment ab, S cannot further decrease since it
has to be nonnegative. Thus, parking becomes saturated again. Then,
the vector elds shown in x2 will apply and therefore the trajectory
will once again hit E1.
For some intermediate values of T , the trajectories may hit the curve
E1d and pass through the area x4. At this time, the trajectory may
either hit E1c and move into x3 (and maybe x2 after that) before
reaching E1 or it may hit the line segment cd. If it hits cd, parking
will have to become unsaturated. Then, the trajectory moves into the
area z5 followed by area z3. Once it is in z3, the trajectory will move
toward the line segment bc and then parking becomes saturated again
before reaching E1 from the area x3.
Yet another possibility occurs for su¢ ciently large values of T and
su¢ ciently small values of C. There has to be an initial condition M
such that the trajectory initiated from M passes through the point
where the _T = 0 locus cuts the NB line, namely point d. Given that
trajectories in this di¤erential equation system cannot intersect unless
one is on the same trajectory as the other, for any initial point on
the right hand side of the path Md, the trajectory will hit the line
segment dB. Once it hits there, C cannot further decrease, parking
becomes unsaturated, and the trajectory will move into the area z6.
Given the vector elds there, it is then obvious that the trajectory
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will move towards E3 to establish a gridlock of cars on the network of
streets. The vector elds in z6 cannot carry a trajectory towards E2.
 Area x2 : The vector elds in this area point north-east. Any trajectory
from any initial condition in this area will trivially reach E1. Parking never
becomes unsaturated along the adjustment path as C will increase at all
times.
 Area x3 : The vector elds in this area point north-west. There are two
possibilities in this area. For lower values of T , the trajectories will enter
x2 (or move along the border of x2 and x3) before reaching E1. For higher
values of T , they hit the equilibrium E1 from the area x3. Parking never
becomes unsaturated along the adjustment path as C will continuously
increase until it reaches a steady-state equilibrium according to the vector
elds.
 Area x4 : The vector elds in this area point south-west. There are two
possibilities in this region. First, the trajectory may hit E1c and enter the
area x3 before hitting E1. The other possibility is that the trajectory may
hit the line segment cd. Once it hits cd, parking becomes unsaturated. The
trajectory then moves into the area z5 followed by area z3 before reaching
E1, as previously explained.
2. Areas in the rectangle ONBVj :
 Area z1 : The vector elds in this area point down-east. Therefore, any
trajectory in this area hits the curve a0 and passes into the area z2. The
vector elds in this area will then carry the trajectories toward the line
segment ab either via area z2 or via the _T = 0 locus. On the line segment
ab, S cannot increase further since it cannot exceed P . Thus, parking
becomes saturated. Then, the vector elds shown in x2 will apply and
therefore the trajectory will hit E1, as previously explained.
 Area z2 : The vector elds in this area point up-east. They will carry the
trajectories toward the line segment ab either via area z2 or via the _T = 0
locus. On the line segment ab, S cannot further decrease since it has to
be nonnegative. Thus, parking becomes saturated and the vector elds of
the area x2 will apply. Consequently, the trajectory will reach E1.
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 Area z3 : The vector elds in this area point up-west. Any trajectory in
this area will hit bc and reach E1, as previously explained.
 Area z4 : The vector elds in this area point up-east. Any trajectory in
this area will rst hit E2Vj and then follow this curve until it reaches the
gridlock equilibrium E3.
 Area z5 : The vector elds in this area point down-west. As previously
explained, any trajectory here will rst hit cE2 and then enter into z3
before reaching E1, as previously explained.
 Area z6 : The vector elds in this area point down-east. Any trajectory
here will either directly hit E3 or follow BVj before doing so.
3. Points on the locus MdE2g :
 Points on the line segment E2g : Since _T = 0 but _S > 0, any trajectory
initiated on this line segment will follow the _T = 0 locus until it reaches
E2.
 Points on the line segment E2d : Since _T = 0 but _S < 0, any trajectory
initiated on this line segment will follow the _T = 0 locus until it reaches
E2. This, along with other parts of the proof, implies that E2 is a saddle
point.
 Points on the adjustment path Md : Any trajectory initiated from
this curve will rst hit d. However, since C cannot be negative, parking
will become unsaturated. Thereafter, the trajectory will follow the _T = 0
locus until it reaches E2, as previously explained.
There are two important corollaries to Proposition 1.
Corollary 1 The hypercongested saturated equilibrium E1, the hypercongested unsat-
urated equilibrium E2, and the hypercongested gridlock equilibrium E3 are all dynam-
ically stable. E1 and E3 are both locally stable equilibria. E2 is not locally stable but
is saddle-path stable.
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This corollary follows directly from Proposition 1 and the denition of dynamic sta-
bility in Denition 5.
Corollary 2 There is no gridlock equilibrium with cruising for parking.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. Start with a situation with tra¢ c
gridlock and cruising for parking. Since tra¢ c is gridlocked, the exit rate from the
in-transit pool and hence the entry rate into the cruising-for-parking pool is zero.
Since parking is saturated, the exit rate from the cruising-for-parking pool is P=l.
The cruising-for-parking pool therefore shrinks.
That completes our formal stability analysis. To provide some intuition for the tra¢ c
systems dynamics, we consider starting in area z4 and investigate how tra¢ c and
parking adjust along the path to the jam density equilibrium E3. In area z4, travel
is so slow that the exit rate from the in-transit pool is lower than the inow, so
that the size of the in-transit pool increases. Since S is low, the exit rate from
the in-transit pool is still larger than the rate at which parking is vacated, so that S
increases. Eventually, however, as travel gets slower and slower and the exit rate from
the in-transit pool decreases, a point is reached where the exit rate from the parking
pool equals the exit rate from the in-transit pool. As time proceeds, travel becomes
even slower, the exit rate from the in-transit pool declines and falls short of the exit
rate from the parking pool. The density of cars in transit continues to increase and
the stock of parked cars decreases asymptotically towards the equilibrium E3. Even
though E3 cannot be reached from the origin with a time-invariant demand function,
a demand pulse may push tra¢ c into the regions z4 or z6, or to the right ofMd in the
saturated régime, and once in those regions, with a time-invariant demand function,
there is no way of escaping.
We have applied global stability analysis, which examines where the tra¢ c system
will move to from any initial condition. Much of the analysis of the existence and sta-
bility of hypercongested equilibria has instead applied local stability analysis, which
examines whether a tra¢ c system that starts in an equilibrium will return to the same
equilibrium after a small perturbation. Since the perturbation results in the starting
point of the transient dynamics being close to an equilibrium, global analysis is more
general. Thus, in the language of the local stability analysis that has been employed
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Note: E1 corresponds to E1 in Figures 6 and 7, which is a saturated,
hypercongested equilibrium. E 01 is the corresponding equilibrium
when there is a moderate increase in demand. E2 corresponds to E2
in Figures 6 and 7.
Figure 8: The e¤ects of an increase in demand when the initial steady-state equilib-
rium is saturated and hypercongested
in much of the debate, the equilibria E1 and E3 are stable with both quantity and
price perturbations.
We have applied our analysis to examine the stability of steady-state equilibria. But
it can also be applied to examine the comparative staticsof steady states, as well as
the path of adjustment between them. Return to Figure 7. Suppose that the tra¢ c
system is in steady-state equilibrium at E1, and consider the e¤ect of a moderate,
once-and-for-all increase in travel demand. This results in a downward shift of the
_T = 0 locus, causing the corresponding equilibrium to relocate to a position on the
_C = 0 locus southeast of E1 call it E 01, for which T is higher and C lower. Since
E1 then lies in the interior of area x1 to the left of the locus MdE2g, the system
moves directly from E1 to E 01 (Figure 8 displays the same result in throughput-
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trip-price space. Demand increases from D to D0, which results in the saturated
equilibrium moving from E1 to E 01). Parking remains saturated so that throughput
remains unchanged. This requires that t increase, which requires that e¤ective density
increase. Since ow equals throughput times (C+T )=T , and since (C+T )=T falls, ow
decreases. Thus, the increase in demand results in reduced velocity and ow (so that
velocity and ow move in the same direction, another indication of hypercongestion)
and no change in throughput. Now consider the e¤ect of a large, once-and-for-all
increase in travel demand, that causes the _T = 0 locus to move downward so far
that no portion lies in the T   C plane. Since the point E1 is then located in the
region x1 to the right of the locus MdE2g, the system moves from E1 to the gridlock
equilibrium (see the movement from D to D00 in Figure 8).
6 Discussion
We now attempt to explain in what ways our results di¤er from those of Verhoef
(1999, 2001, and 2003), Small and Chu (2003), and Small and Verhoef (2007), and
why. One source of di¤erence is di¤erence in models, which reect di¤erences in
travel contexts. In the bulk of their work, Small and Verhoef had in mind highway or
freeway tra¢ c ow, in which dissipative activity takes the form either a vertical queue
or a horizontal queue that does not interfere with tra¢ c ow, whether at entry points
to the road or at bottlenecks along it. In contrast, we considered downtown tra¢ c
in which queuing, in particular cruising for parking, interferes with tra¢ c ow. We
do not dispute Small and Verhoefs logic but, even in the context of freeway tra¢ c
ow, queues sometimes back up from a bottleneck to the next bottleneck upstream,
reducing the latters capacity; the turbulence generated at entry points reduces the
capacity of the freeway (which is the main reason that ramp metering is e¤ective); and
when two lanes merge, the e¢ ciency of the merge falls as the time delay associated
with it increases, as drivers become increasingly frustrated and aggressive.
Another source of di¤erence between our results and Small and Verhoefs lies in the
denition of a hypercongested equilibrium. The di¤erence in denitions stems from
our distinction between ow and throughput, which is not present in their models
since they do not have cruising for parking. In their models, hypercongestion is
present in a steady-state equilibrium if and only if the equilibrium is on the backward-
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bending portion of the user cost curve. Thus, they naturally refer to steady-state
equilibria on the backward-bending portion of user cost curve as hypercongested
equilibria. We dene hypercongestion to occur if travel speed is lower than the speed
associated with maximum throughput, and a steady-state hypercongested equilibrium
to be one in which there is hypercongestion according to this denition. Return
to Figure 5. According to our denition, equilibrium E1 may be either congested
or hypercongested, depending on whether travel speed is higher or lower than that
associated with maximum throughput.
Based on the assumption that dissipative activity takes the form of a queue that does
not interfere with tra¢ c ow, they argue that the backward-bending portion of the
user cost curve should be replaced by a vertical segment at capacity ow. While we
conducted our analysis without reference to the user cost curve, we recast it in that
space. Our user cost curve plotted throughput against user cost, and had four di¤erent
sections. The rst is the upward-sloping section of the user cost curve up to parking
capacity; an intersection of the steady-state demand curve with this section of the
user cost curve corresponds to a stable, congested equilibrium (it would be E4 when
the parking capacity constraint does not bind). The second is the parking capacity
constraint; an intersection of the steady-state demand curve and the parking capacity
constraint corresponds to the saturated equilibrium in our analysis. The third is the
backward-bending section of the user cost curve for nite trip price; an intersection
of the steady-state demand curve and this section of the user cost curve corresponds
to the saddlepoint equilibrium E2 in our analysis.20 The fourth is the section of the
user cost curve where user cost is innite; and intersection of the steady-state demand
curve and this section of the user cost curve corresponds to the gridlock equilibrium21,
E4.
Yet another source of di¤erence between our results and Small and Verhoefs lies in
the notion of stability. They conducted local stability analysis, while our stability
20With our choice of functional forms and parameters, the demand curve intersects this section of
the user cost curve only once. In general, the demand curve can intersect this section multiple times.
We conjecture but have not proved that each of the corresponding intersection points corresponds
to an equilibrium that is saddle-path stable, which is consistent with Elses and Nashs analyses.
21Because we assumed demand to be isoelastic, the demand and user cost curves intersect
at zero throughput and innite user cost. Suppose instead that the maximum willingness to pay
for travel is nite, so that the demand curve intersects the user cost axis at a nite price. The
demand is zero above this price. Thus, once again, the demand and user cost curves intersect at
zero throughput and innite user cost.
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analysis was global. Our analysis is more general.
These sources of di¤erence notwithstanding, there remains a more basic point of dis-
agreement between Small and Verhoef on one hand, and ourselves on the other, that
the current state of the literature, including our paper, does not resolve. They appear
to believe that, at the aggregate level, tra¢ c systems do not respond to an increase in
demand by providing reduced throughput, or at least if they do that these situations
are practically unimportant. Though our model does not provide a strong case that
they are mistaken22, we disagree.23 Many physical systems respond to increased load
with decreased throughput: electrical networks respond to high load with brownouts
and blackouts; before ber-optic technology, long-distance telephone switches used to
get jammed with high demand; the absorptive capacity of the environment may fall as
the level of pollution increases; etc. We see no reason why tra¢ c systems should not
behave similarly. Some recent work provides some support for our view. May, Shep-
herd, and Bates (2000) used the tra¢ c microsimulation model NEMIS to simulate the
e¤ects of an increase in demand on average network speed (veh  km=veh  hr) and
average network travel (veh  km=hr) in hypothetical grid and ring radial networks.
For both network congurations, they found that above critical levels of demand
both average network speed and average network travel decline the network analog
of travel on the backward-bending portion of the user cost curve. While the paper
provided little explanation of this result, we suspect that queue spillbacks and the re-
22At the end of the previous section, we established that in our model, starting from the well-
behaved steady-state equilibrium, E1, a su¢ ciently large once-and-for-all increase in demand leads to
gridlock. But since we do not observe gridlock, this theoretical counterexample is hardly compelling.
23Arnotts views have changed over the years according to the models he was working on and the
contemporaneous literature in transportation engineering journals. When working with André de
Palma and Robin Lindsey on the bottleneck model, where a road segments capacity in determined
by the discharge rate of the segments tightest bottleneck and not by the number of cars in the
bottleneck queues, he was inclined to the view that hypercongestion is a localized and transient
phenomenon occurring within the bottleneck queues. This view was supported by careful analysis of
detailed tra¢ c ow data (e.g., Hall, Allen, and Gunter, 1986; Daganzo, Cassidy, and Bertini, 1999) by
transportation scientists, and is essentially the same as Small and Verhoefs current views. His views
have changed largely as a result of thinking about downtown tra¢ c congestion, where intersection
capacity falls when demand is high due to spillbacks and the increased aggressiveness of drivers in
heavily congested tra¢ c, and where cruising for parking and double parking severely interfere with
tra¢ c ow. In that tra¢ c context, the larger are the queues at intersections and the quasi-queues
associated with searching for parking, the lower is system throughput. Looking at highways from
that perspective, he has come to the view that similar phenomena occur in highway travel in very
heavily congested conditions. The transportation science literature has been undergoing a similar
change in perspective (e.g., Varaiya, 2008, on ramp metering; Daganzo, 2002, on merging tra¢ c
streams downstream of on-ramps; and Lo and Szeto, 2005, on spillbacks).
32
duced capacity of intersections with increased demand are responsible. Lo and Szeto
(2005) demonstrates in a dynamic, physical queuing network model how spillbacks
can generate hypercongestion. Since both papers employ models that are dynamic in
Verhoefs terminology, they do not however establish the existence of stable, hyper-
congested, steady-state equilibria.
Where does all this leave us in terms of the debate on the possibility of stable,
hypercongested, steady-state tra¢ c equilibria? This paper has contributed to the
debate by providing a thorough analysis of a quite particular model. It has not
resolved the debate, and indeed we are not sure that the debate will ever be resolved
since the terms of the debate may keep changing as our mathematical tools and
understanding of tra¢ c ow become more sophisticated. The debate has nonetheless
been fruitful since it has demonstrated the importance of precision in denition and
analysis in this context and has improved our understanding of both the economics
and physics of tra¢ c ow.
A Appendix
A.1 Trajectories
This appendix presents some trajectories of the di¤erential equation system. For exposi-
tional convenience, we shall make a transformation of variables and reduce the 3D system
to a 2D system. The proper transformation is dened as follows. Dene
R = R+ +R  ; (A-1)
where
R+ = maxfR; 0g = R+ jRj
2
(A-2)
R  = minfR; 0g = R  jRj
2
: (A-3)
Let C(u) = R+(u) and S(u) = P + R (u). Note that when R(u)  0, C(u) = R(u)
and S(u) = P , and when R(u)  0, C(u) = 0 and S(u) = P + R(u). The transformed
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autonomous di¤erential equation system is given by
_T (u) = D((mt(T (u);
1
2
(jRj+R); P ) +
1
2(jRj+R)l
P
) + l)  T (u)
mt(T (u); 12(jRj+R); P )
(A-4)
_R(u) =
T (u)
mt(T (u); 12(jRj+R); P )
  P +
1
2(R  jRj)
l
: (A-5)
Since this system is Leibnitz, all existence and uniqueness theorems apply. However, the
system is only piecewise di¤erentiable and there is a phase transition at R+(u) = 0.
Figure 9: Trajectories of the transformed di¤erential equation system
Geometrically, this transformation corresponds to making the vertical portion of Figure 7
horizontal and stretching C and S accordingly. The transformed system is shown in Figure
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9, which assumes the parameter values stated in Section 4.1. In this gure, the _T (u) = 0
and _R(u) = 0 loci are shown with solid lines and trajectories with dotted lines. We do not
show E3 since doing so would entail loss of important detail, but one should note that the
_R(u) = 0 locus cuts the x axis when fT;Rg = f1778:17; 3712g, which corresponds to
jam density. However, we shown one of the trajectories approaching E3 at the far right of
the gure.
A.2 Derivation of E = T=(mt)
This appendix derives the equilibrium condition E = T=(mt). Let A (arrivals) denote
the cumulative number of cars that have entered the downtown area, X (exits) denote
the cumulative number of cars that have exited the downtown area, and S the stock of
occupied parking spaces. We have the stock identity that A = T + C + S + X. Thus,
_A = _T + _C + _S + _X. Moreover, D is the entry rate into downtown and thus _A = D. Since
visit lengths are Poisson distributed, with mean l, we have _X = S=l. Letting E denote the
exit rate from the in-transit pool and Z the exit rate from the cruising-for-parking pool, we
have that _T = D   E, _C = E   Z, and _S = Z   S=l. We have two régimes to consider. In
the saturated parking régime:
Z =
P
l
(A-6)
_P = 0 ; (A-7)
whereas in the unsaturated parking régime:
Z = E (A-8)
_S = E   S
l
: (A-9)
From these equations, it is evident that the entire evolution can be determined once E is
calculated. Let M be the cumulative number of cars that have exited the in-transit pool,
so that E = _M and T = A  M . The technology of tra¢ c congestion is captured by the
function t = t(T;C; P ) or alternatively by v = v(T;C; P ). Consider a car that enters the
in-transit pool at time u. By time w it has traveled a distance
x(u;w) =
wZ
u
v(y)dy : (A-10)
Thus, of the cars that enter the in-transit pool at time u, the proportion that have exited
it by time w, (w; u), is
(w; u) = 1  e hx(u;w) ; (A-11)
where h = 1=m, and so the number that have exited it by time m, N(w; u), is
N(w; u) = D(u)(1  e hx(u;w)) : (A-12)
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As a result, the total number of cars that have exited the in-transit pool by time w, M(w),
is
M(w) =
wZ
0
D(u)(1  e hx(u;w))du : (A-13)
Di¤erentiating this with respect to w, we obtain
_M(w) = D(w)(1  e hx(w;w)) +
wZ
0
D(u)hxw(u;w)e
 hx(u;w))du : (A-14)
Since the rst term on the right hand side is zero, we have
_M(w) =
wZ
0
D(u)hxw(u;w)e
 hx(u;w)du : (A-15)
From (A-11), xw(u;w) = v(w). This comes out of the integral, so that we have
_M(w) = v(w)
wZ
u
D(u)he hx(u;w)du : (A-16)
The total number of cars that have entered the in-transit pool by time w is simply
A(w) =
wZ
0
D(u)du : (A-17)
Thus, the stock of cars in the in-transit pool at time w is
T (w) =
wZ
0
D(u)e hx(u;w)du : (A-18)
Combining this with (A-16), we obtain
_M(w) = v(w)hT (w) ; (A-19)
and thus E = vhT or
E =
T
mt
: (A-20)
A.3 Equilibrium and stability with no parking constraint
The model that has been the focus of the debate over the existence and stability of steady-
state hypercongested equilibria does not contain parking. It is therefore natural to enquire
into the existence and stability of hypercongested equilibria in a simplied version of our
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model without parking. This is a special case of our model for which the parking constraint
does not bind, the tra¢ c system is always in régime 2, and the parking fee is zero. Modifying
the example so that the demand function here with  = 0 is the same as before with  = 1,
Figures 4 and 5 continue to apply, except that the parking capacity constraint does not
bind. There are then three equilibrium E4, E3, and E2. E4 is locally stable and is reached
starting from any initial point to the left of the locus dE2g in Figure 4; E3 is the locally
stable, gridlock equilibrium, and is reached from any initial point to the right of the locus
dE2g; and E2 is the saddle-path stable equilibrium, and is reached from any initial point
on the locus dE2g. The issue of central interest is whether tra¢ c in the equilibria E4 and
E2 is congested or hypercongested. Since there are no cars cruising for parking, ow and
throughput coincide, and tra¢ c is congested when T < Vj=2 and is hypercongested when
the inequality is reversed. Since T = Vj=2 at the peak of the _S = 0 locus, as Figure 4 is
drawn E4 is congested and E2 is hypercongested. But from Figure 5, it can be seen that if
demand is increased so that E4 lies on the backward-bending portion of the user cost curve,
all the equilibria are hypercongested. And above a critical level of demand, the equilibria
E2 and E4 disappear and only the gridlock equilibrium E3 remains.
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